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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHARON ROBER TS 
vs. 
TRACKvVORK CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10862 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment based on a 
special verdiuct of a jury wherein a finding was made 
in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiff, and 
from the rulings of the Court, denying Plaintiff's motion 
for a directed verdict, denying certain of Plaintiff's re-
quests for instructions and from an Order denying Plain-
tiff's motion for a new trial. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On November 9, 1965, the Plaintiff and appellant 
herein filed a Complaint against the Defendant for in-
2 
juries she sustained when she drove her automobile 1 a ong 
a road located upon the Tooele Army Depot T 1 ~ , ooe" 
County, Utah, and across certain railroad tracks wh' L, 
. d "d d d h" !Cu mtersecte . sa1 roa an w 1ch tracks were then and 
~here repaired ~y the Defendant. (R-1). Plaintiff alleged 
m her Complamt that the crossmg was left unattended 
while being so repaired, with no warning signs to warn 
Plaintiff or other motorists using the road of the danger. 
ous conditions of the road while so being repaired. Pl;in-
tiff alleges certain in juries sustained when the car which 
she was driving struck one of the rails of said track 
which was then and there projecting three or four inches 
above the other track upon said intersection, thereb1 
creating a hazard; that the bumper of her car struck said 
rail, suddenly stopping her car and throwing her against 
the steering post with such force and impact that her 
lower jaw was broken; her teeth were knocked loose and 
had to be removed and other in juries suffered. Plaintiff 
alleges in substance that she was using the road in a 
lawful manner and driving at a rate of speed not in excess 
of 12 miles per hour. Defendant in answer denied the 
allegations of Plaintiff's complaint and alleges negligence 
and contributory negligence on the part of the Plaintiff 
( R-2 ) . After certain discovery methods as provided by 
law had been taken by both of the parties, a pre-trial 
conference was held on the 9th day of June, 1966, in 
which the issues were defined as hereinabove set forth 
(R-7). This case came on for trial the first day of De· 
cember, 1966. Plaintiff specifically requested in his re-
quest for instructions that the Court direct the jury to 
return a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and against the 
3 
Defendant and leave to the jury only the question of the 
,,xtent of the damages to the Plaintiff ( R-16). 
The Court submitted to the jury six propositions to 
be ans,vered in its special verdict ( R-12). The substance 
of the findings of the jury in the answer to these proposi-
tions \\"aS a general verdict in favor of the Defendant and 
a~ainst the Plaintiff. This verdict waus returned on De-
c~mbcr 2, 1966 ( R-12). Thereafter the Plaintiff filed 
her motion for a new trial and set forth certain grounds 
in support of said motion (R-20). The Court thereafter 
on January 9, 1967, denied Plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff 
was not informed of the ruling until most of her time for 
,1ppeal had gone by, but the Court thereafter, based upon 
Plaintiff's motion and affidavit (R-21 & 22), extended 
Plaintiffs time for appeal (R-23). Plaintiff thereafter 
filed Notice of Appeal from the rulings of the Court, 
both at the time of the trial as hereinafter set forth, and 
from the Court's denial of her motion for new trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON RULING 
The appellant asks this Court to reverse the ruling 
of the trial Court denying plaintiff's motion for a new 
trial, based upon the trial Court's refusal to grant a new 
trial for the reason set forth in her motion (R-20), and 
for the Court's refusal at the time of trial to direct a 
verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defend-
ant and leave to the jury only the question of damages. 
Plaintiff seeks to have this Court make and enter its 
order remanding this cast to the District Court for a new 
trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant and Respondent herein was 
0 . ' n and 
pnor to the 5th day of November, 1965, engaged bv h 
United States Government in repairing and repl~ ~ e 
certain railroad tracks and crossings at the Tooele A cmg 
• 11.rm1 
Depot m Tooele County, Utah; that on the 5th dav 1 
November, while repairing the tracks it left one rail :f 
the tracks projecting from three to four inches above the 
other rail and left the crossing otherwise in an unsafe 
condition for travel. The Plaintiff on said day was em. 
ployed by the Tooele Army Depot, and in the course of 
her employment and in the discharge of her duties was 
traveling west along said road at the rate of speed of 
approximately twelve miles per hour (TR-4, line 6). The 
woman who was then and there riding in Plaintiff's au-
tomobile, Mrs. Irene Cherry, testified that Plaintiff was 
traveling about fifteen miles per hour (TR p. 29, lines 
15-23). The only other individual witness was one Clyde 
Moore, who testified that the Plaintiff was traveling be-
tween 10 and 15 miles per hour and not in excess of 
fifteen miles per hour (TR, p. 44, lines 2 7 -29 ) . When 
Plaintiff attempted to cross the rail which was left pro-
jecting above the other rail, as hereinabove described, 
the car she was driving and particularly the bumper 
thereof, caught under the rail and stopped the car sud-
denly, throwing her against the steering wheel of the car, 
thereby fracturing her lower jaw and loosening the teeth 
of her lower jaw to the point where they all were re· 
quired to be removed. (TR, p. 4, lines 9-11.) Evidence 
was introduced showing that the track and particularly 
the rail in question had been left projecting three or four 
inches across the road and intersection and unattended 
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and without any warning signals or other devices to warn 
the Plaintiff and other users of the road of the danger 
which the Defendant had created (TR, p. 11, lines 27-
30). The jury in its special verdict in response to the 
Proposition #3, "The Defendant was negligent in that 
the Defendant did not warn the Plaintiff by signs or 
otherwise of the danger in crossing the tracks, answered 
''True." Further evidence was introduced by medical 
testimony of the injuries, pain and suffering of the Plain-
tiff and of the medical treatment which she was required 
to undergo (TR, p. 36-42). It was also shown at the 
time of the trial that the Defendant had placed gravel 
upon the crossing as a temporary means of making the 
crossing passable, which gravel had been partially thrown 
out of the location between the rails and the bed (TR, 
p. 90, line 1 ) . There was also evidence introduced that 
the speed limit upon said road was 30 miles per hour 
(TR, p. 22, line 1). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REFUSAL 
TO DIRECT A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF PLAIN-
TIFF AND AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
The trial Court erred in its refusal to direct a verdict 
in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant and 
leave for its consideration only the extent of damages 
sustained by the Plaintiff. In this case there was no evi-
dence offered in support of Defendant's position that the 
Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. There 
was no evidence of excessive speed on the part of the 
6 
Plaintiff. The only testimony of the eye witness , b . . vas v 
the Plamtiff, Mrs. Cherry, the passenger, and Mr. Cha, 
Moore who saw the accident. They each testified th t 
the speed of the car did not exceed fifteen miles per ho a. 
In this regard the testimony of the Defendant's witne~:· 
Mr. Kay Hanson, should be noted. His testimony reflec .. 
that at most his investigation was of a casual nature (T;'. 
101, lines 2 and 3). Further, that his computations were 
not exact and were, in fact, planned so as to come om 
even. 
Mr. Hanson testified that if the car were going ten 
to fifteen miles per hour, it could not have lifted the 
rail. He therefore concludes that the car must have been 
going faster. His computations are based on a premise 
that the rail was down. Mr. Hanson testified that it 
would be necessary for 200,000 pounds of force to pull 
up the 69 feet of rail and spines. In short, what l\Ir. 
Hanson has done is to assume the result he wants and 
work his calculations around that result. 
The Defendant's next witness, Kenneth Schefski, 
testified that a car in normal working condition would 
not bottom or touch the bumper to the road. This wit· 
ness again assumes a speed of at least twenty-five miles 
per hour and states that the slower a car travels, the less 
likely it would be to bottom out. 
The evidence taken as a whole, would indicate that 
a car traversing this crossing at a speed of from twelve 
to fifteen miles an hour would not bottom out. The only 
possible conclusion that a reasonable mind could draw, 
is that the rail in question was left so high as to constitute 
a hazard to vehicular traffic. 
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POINT 2 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REFUSAL 
ro GRANT PLAINTIFF A NEW TRIAL. 
The Court erred in its refusal to grant Plaintiff's 
motion for a new trial. The same considerations which 
would require a directed verdict also compel a new trial. 
f n hoth cases the moving party's evidence is such that it 
can lead to one conclusion. In neither case would the 
opposing party have sustained its burden of proof. In 
ihjs case, there is no competent evidence that the Plaintiff 
faded to use due care and caution in the control and 
operation of her vehicle, nor could she, in the normal 
course of things, observe the danger which the Def end-
ant had created. In short, there is no evidence to support 
the jury's findings. In such cases it is well settled that 
the trial Court has the power to set the jury's verdict 
aside and to grant a new trial. The rational is that the 
jury has either misconstrued he evidence, been Gonfused, 
or has ignored the Court's instructions. To let a verdict 
stand where there is no competent evidence to support it, 
is to deny to the Plaintiff her right to trial by jury. In 
the case of Saltas vs. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 Pac. 2d, 
171, the Court held, "A new trial may be granted upon 
the Court's own motion when there has been such a plain 
disregard by the jury of the instructions of the Court on 
the evidence in the case as to satisfy the Court that the 
verdict was rendered under a misapprehension of such 
instructions or under the influence of passion or preju-
dice." Moffat, C. J., "While we so stated, we also held 
that the amount of the verdict is a matter exclusively for 
the jury. On the ground of adequacy of the verdict alone, 
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the Court may not inter£ ere with the jury's verdict H 
ever, if inadequacy or excessiveness of the verdict p.re ow. 
. . h h . d sent1 a situation t at sue ma equacy or excessiveness sh , 
a disregard by the jury of the evidence or the instruct?\V) 
1011.1 
of the Court as to the law applicable to the case as t, 
satisfy the Court that the verdict was rendered undeo 
such disregard or misapprehension of the evidence 0~ 
instructions or under the influence of passion or prejudice, 
then the Court may exercise its discretion in the interest 
of justice and grant a new trial." 
32 C.J.S., p. 116, Section 1042, "A verdict or find. 
ing must be based on the evidence and must be based 
on the facts proved. Under this well established rule, the 
verdict or finding cannot rest on surmise or speculation. 
Likewise, under the above mentioned well established 
rule a verdict or finding cannot rest on conjecture. Like-
wise, under the above mentioned well established rule, 
a verdict or finding cannot rest on guess, supposition, as-
sumption, imagination, or suspicion. The evidence on 
which the verdict or finding is based must be competent, 
legal evidence, and must support every material fact; and 
where there is no evidence, or the evidence as to a ma-
terial issu eis insufficient, the decision should be against 
the party having the burden of proof. The evidence must 
be sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief in the exist-
ence of those facts which the verdict or finding establish-
es ; the verdict or finding must be grounded on a reason-
able certainty as to probabilities arising from a fair con-
sideration of the evidence, and not on mere possibilities. 
While there is no set formula for determining the 
quantum of evidence required, each case being governed 
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by its own circumstances, the verdict or findings must be 
supported by substantial evidence. Under the above men-
tioned rule, according to the decisions, a scintilla of evi-
dence is not sufficient." 
See Seybold vs. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 121 
Utah 61, 231 Pac. 2nd 174. "First, as to the question of 
lights on the caboose: Was there sufficient evidence for 
the jury to find it had no lights? We have no disagree-
ment with the time-honored rule that if there is substan-
tial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of the 
fact, it will not be disturbed on review. But that means 
more than a mere scintilla of evidence. See 9 Wigmore, 
3d Ed., Sec. 2494, for a discussion of the test to be applied 
to the quantum of evidence necessary to support a finding 
by the trier of fact. In that section, at page 296, he says, 
"There was an old phrase that a mere scintilla of 
evidence was sufficient; but this has been abandoned by 
most courts." 
Citing a plethora of cases. After referring to a varie-
ty of methods of phrasing the rule and a great many 
authorities, he concludes the section with this: 
"Perhaps the best statement of the test is: 
Are there facts in evidence which if unanswered 
would justify men of ordinary reason and fairness 
in affirming the question which the plaintiff is 
bound to maintain." 
We approve the rule thus stated by Mr. Wigmore. 
If there is any substantial competent evidence upon which 
a jury acting fairly and reasonably could make the find-
ing, it should stand. But if the finding is so plainly un-
reasonable as to convince the court that no jury acting 
10 
fairly and reasonably could make the finding it 
. ' cann01 
be said to be supported by substantial evidence. See 1 20 Am. Jr. 1033." a so 
Dem vs. Carbon County Land Company, 94 lltah 
76-75 Pac. 2nd 660. "A finding of fact cannot be based 
0 . . n 
surmise, con1ecture, guess or speculation." Jensen '" . ), 
Howell, 75 Utah 64, 282 Pac. 1034. "In this jurisdiction 
the binding effect of findings of the trial court in law 
cases is different from that in equity cases. In the former 
the findings, as a general rule, are a pp roved if there ~ 
sufficient competent evidence to support them, and, ordi-
narily, are not disturbed, unless it is manifest that thri· 
are so clearly against the weight of the evidence as :o 
indicate a misconception, or not a due consideration of it.'' 
Spackman vs. Benefit Association of Railway Em. 
ployees, 97 Utah, 91, 89 Pac. 2d, 490: Moffat, C. J., 
"A verdict of a jury may not be based upon testimony 
showing only possibility or such situations as requires a 
jury to base its verdict upon conjecture, speculation or 
suspense. Edwards vs. Clark, et al., 96 Utah, 121, 83 Pac. 
2d 1021. 
Valiotis vs. Utah-Apex Mining Company, 55 Utah 
151, 184 Pac., 802, Pratt, D. J., "If it should appear that 
the evidence on which the verdict is based is so incredible 
or inherently improbable or so inconsistent with or con· 
trary to natural laws or physical facts, as to impel but 
the one conclusion that the verdict is the result of mistak~ 
prejudice, or passion, we might then very properly say 
that the verdict is not supported by substantial evidence, 
or that there is not a substantial conflict of evidence, and 
11 
thcrcf ore the lower court abused its discretion or erred 
in refusing to grant the new trial. In such a case we look 
into the evidence, examine its legal effect, and opposing 
logical tendencies, if any, not for the purpose of deciding 
1.h~' facts, as we may do in equity cases, but to determine 
\\ hcthcr or not the trial court erred in its application of 
fixrd legal principles. Our power or authority to do so 
musL of course, be exercised cautiously; but the fact that 
an incautious exercise of such power may transcend our 
cnnstitutional authority in cases at law to hear and 
(:f·tcnnine questions of law only is not inconsistent with 
its cx1~tcnce. A question of law is never an abstract ques-
tion It arises only with respect to ascertained facts or 
tb·ir logical and legal tendencies as matter of proof. The 
inquiry then is: What are the facts? And, secondly, what 
is the legal principle applicable thereto? If the evidence, 
taken as a whole, be reasonably susceptible of opposite 
conclusions as to the existence or nonexistence of an 
ultimate fact, depending upon inferences to be drawn 
therefrom, or the weight to be given to the testimony of 
this or that witness, or set of witnesses, we must con-
clusively presume the fact to be such as will support the 
ruling which we are called upon to review; but if, after 
giving due consideration to the fact that the trial judge 
is better able to weigh conflicting evidence, the evidence 
be such nevertheless as to impel but one reasonable con-
clusion, and that as to a fact adverse to the ruling, it 
would be our duty as an appellate court to so declare, 
notwithstanding there might be some conflict in the evi-
dence." 
12 
In Stafford vs. Adams, 113 Mo. App. 71 7, 88 S.W 
1130, the court said: · 
"It is the duty of courts to determine what cons· 
tutes substantial evidence, and the business of the tri~l· 
of fact to settle conflicts therein." rs 
And the same court, in Brockman Commission Cc. 
vs. Aaron, 145 Mo. App. 307, 130 S.W. 16, said: 
"While appellate courts uniformly adhere to 
the rule that the credibility of witnesses and the 
weight to be given their testimony are issues of 
fact and not of law, the rule has never been carried 
to the length of requiring courts to accord pro-
bative value to testimony that is so palpably false 
or absurd that no reasonable mind would give it 
any credence. It is within the province of the court 
to ascertain whether or not testimony has any 
evidentiary strength, and, if it is found to be im· 
potent, to cast it aside as though it had not been 
given." 
In the case of Toledo, St. L. & W. R. Co. vs. Howe, 
191 Fed. 776, at page 782, 112 C.C.A. 262, at page 268, 
"substantial evidence" is defined with reference to the 
facts of that case as follows: 
"It must be said Judge Severens, some· 
thing of substance and relevant consequence, and 
not vague, uncertain or irrelevant ~atte~ not 
carrying the quality of "proof" or havmg f1tne&1 
to induce conviction.' " 
And again, at page 785, of 191 Fed., at page 271 
of 112 C.C.A.: 
13 
"If the circumstances are such that it can be 
said fair-minded men might not agree as to the 
conclusions to be drawn, the case must be submit-
ted to the jury." 
In Newton vs. Railroad Co., 43 Utah, at page 229, 
i 3+ Pac. at page 5 71, this court said: 
"If it is clear that the injured person failed 
to exercise ordinary care, the question is one of 
law; but, if the circumstances are such as to leave 
that question shrouded in doubt to the extent that 
different minds may fairly and honestly arrive at 
different conclusions, then it is a question of fact." 
We submit the Court in the case at bar, erred in its 
refusal to grant a new trial based upon the insufficiency 
of the evidence of any negligence or misconduct on the 
part of the Plaintiff. 
POINT 3 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A 
JUDGMENT UPON INCONSISTENT JURY FIND-
INGS. 
The jury found Proposition # 1 and Proposition #2 
to be false. In substance the propositions were that the 
defendant created an unobservable hazard for vehicular 
traffic by leaving the rail too high. The jury then went 
on to find Proposition # 3 to be true. The defendant was 
negligent in failing to warn the plaintiff by signs or other-
wise of the danger in crossing the tracks. If it were not 
the danger created by the high rail, then it can only be 
speculation as to what other danger the jury refers to in 
Proposition #3. The Kansas Supreme Court in the case 
14 
of King vs. Vets Cab Inc., 179 Kansas 379 295 p , 
. . ' ac. ld. 
605, 56 A.L.R. 2d 1249, discusses mconsistent · 
f . d" Th C special m mgs. at ourt holds that the trial Court , . h . . . ma, 
not ignore sue mconsistencies and must upon pro · 
. d . 1 per motion or er a new tna . 
"We next turn to defendant's contention that the 
court erred in overruling its motion for judgment on the 
answers to the special questions. Did these answers to 
the questions compel the court to set aside the general 
verdict and render judgment in favor of defendant, or 
grant a new trial? It is an elementary rule that a general 
verdict in favor of a party to an action imports a findmg 
in his favor upon all issues in the case, not inconsistent 
with the special findings, and nothing will be preSlUileJ 
in favor of the special findings. They shall be given such 
construction, if possible, as will bring them into harmony 
with the general verdict, and the court is not permitted 
to isolate one answer and ignore others, but is required 
to consider all of them together, and if one interpretation 
leads to inconsistency, and another to harmony with the 
general verdict, the latter is to be adopted. Marley vs. 
Wichita Transportation Corp., 150 Kan. 818, 96 P. 2d 
877; Sams vs. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 157 Kan. 
278, 130 P. 2d 859. The general verdict may be set aside 
only when the special findings are contrary to the verdict 
and compel judgment setting aside the general verdict as 
a matter of law. Unless the effect of special findings, 
when considered as a whole, is such as to overthrow the 
general verdict, the verdict must stand. Johnson-Sampson 
Construction Co. vs. Casterline Grain & Seed, Inc., 173 
15 
Kan. 763, 252 P. 2d 893. With the foregoing rules of 
la\i· in mind, it is apparent the jury found by its answer 
to question No. 3 that plaintiff's fall was not the result 
of an unavoidable accident, and by its answer to question 
)io. 2. defendant was negligent in that plaintiff was hav-
in" difficulty in descending from the cab, and the driver 
sh~uld have assisted her. In view of the answer to ques-
tion No. 2, the general verdict and the evidence, it is 
,1b\·iou:'. that the jury found plaintiff was having difficulty 
in alighting from the cab and that she had requested 
assistance from the driver, and he was guilty of negligence 
m not rendering assistance. By its answer to question No. 
L the jury found plaintiff was guilty of negligence only 
to the extent that she did not wait for reasonable assist-
:ince from the driver in alighting from the vehicle. The 
jur;: did not find by direct answer that plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence. The answer is not clear, 
definite and certain. It is ambiguous and too uncertain 
to be a basis for a valid judgment in favor of the defend-
ant on the theory that she was guilty of contributory 
negligence. It is inconsistent with the answer to ques~ion 
No. 2. In one answer, the jury finds that the driver should 
have assisted her, implying that he had opportunity and 
time to do so, and in the other that she did not wait for 
assistance, whatever the term "wait" implies. Consistent 
special findings control the general verdict when con-
trary thereto, but when they are inconsistent with one 
another, some showing a right to a verdict, and others 
showing the contrary, the case is left in the condition of 
really being undecided, and a new trial should be granted. 
Willis vs. Skinner, 89 Kan. 145, 130 P. 673; Packer vs. 
16 
Fairmont Creamery Co., 158 Kan. 191 146 p ')d 
40 ' . ... I 
McCoy vs. Weber, .168 Kan. 241, 212 P. 2d 281 
In re Estate of Erwm, 1 70 Kan. 728 228 p 2d ~ ... ' 
. ' . /j~· 
89 CJS, Tnal #552, p. 307. It cannot be said that th, 
defendant was entitled to judgment on the answe :e 
the special questions." 
rs •'J 
.It. is ~ot only within .the bound.s of the trial judge. 
but it is his duty to set aside a verdict where a jury has 
failed to follow the Court's instructions or has made in-
consistent findings on propositions submitted to it. "Vir. 
ginian R.R. Company vs. Armantrout, 166 Fed. 400, 4 
A.LR. 2d 1064. The law gives ample power to see that 
justice is done in cases pending before him; and the 
responsibility attendant upon such power is his in full 
measure. While according due respect to the findings of 
the jury, he should not hesitate to set aside their verdict 
and grant a new trial in any case where the ends of 
justice so require. Aetna Casualty & ~urety Co. v. Yeatts, 
A Cir., 122 F 2d 350. 
The power of this court to reverse the trial court 
for failure to exercise the power, where such failure, as 
here, amounts to an abuse of discretion, is likewise clear. 
It is true that under #22 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
28 USCA #879, there may be no reversal on writ of 
error for any error in fact; and this rule has been fre· 
quently applied where reversal is sought because damages 
are excessive or inadequate. Fairmont Glass Works vs. 
Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 US 4 74, 53 S. Ct. 252, 77 L. ed 
439. We do not understand the rule to have application, 
however, in those exceptional circumstances where the 
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"erdict is so manifestly without support in the evidence 
that failure to set it aside amounts to an abuse of dis-
cretion. In a situation of that sort, reversal is no more 
based on "error in fact" than reversal for refusal to direct 
a verdict for insufficiency of evidence. Whether there has 
been an abuse of discretion is a question of law in the 
one case, just as is the legal sufficiency of the evidence in 
the other. An appelaute court is not required to place 
the seal of its approval upon a judgment vitiated by an 
abuse of discretion." 
The inconsistent findings are no findings. It is as if 
the Court has entered judgment upon no verdict at all. 
The jury here has failed in its duty to determine the 
facts. The only remedy in this event is to order the matter 
tried anew. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Plaintiff and appellant herein, submits in conclusion, 
that there was no evidence offered at the time of the trial 
to support defendant's position that the plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent or that she in any way was guilty of 
any improper conduct which tended to cause the injuries 
of which she complains. She was therefore entitled to 
have the jury determine only the question of the extent of 
her damages and she was further entitled to an order 
from the Court directing the jury to find liability on the 
part of the defendant. To cure this error in the District 
Court's ruling, appellant herein submits that she is en-
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titled to have this case remanded to the District Court 
for a new trial granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LAMAR DUNCAN 
DONALD SAWAYA 
706 Phillips Petroleum Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 1 
Attorneys for Appellant 
